Why a cooperative negotiation strategy might be more effective than a competitive one

Theresa May would prefer no deal to a “bad deal”, Jeremy Corbyn believes no deal is a bad deal.

Under the Tories, a post-Brexit future for UK without a deal with the EU is conceivable. A Conservative government would be happy to walk away from negotiations if their demands are not (or not sufficiently) met. Under Labour, we would expect the Government to do everything in its power to reach a deal with the EU.

On the face of it, these two approaches represent two classically opposing negotiation styles, on the one hand a competitive, or “positional” strategy, on the other a cooperative, or “interest-based” one. Or, as the Guardian refers to them, the “stick” and “carrot”. Social psychologist Morton Deutsch [2] described the difference as follows:

“A cooperative process leads to the defining of conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort. It facilitates the recognition of the legitimacy of each other’s interests and of the necessity of searching for a solution that is responsive to the needs of all. It tends to limit rather than expand the scope of conflicting interests. In contrast, a competitive process stimulates the view that the solution of conflict can only be one that is imposed by one side on the other … through superior force, deceptions or cleverness. … The enhancement of one’s own power and the minimization of the legitimacy of the other side’s interests in the situation become objectives.” [1]

The difference in May and Corbyn’s negotiating styles is borne out by much of the recent Brexit rhetoric.

In his recent Brexit speech in Basildon, Corbyn spelt out Labour’s strategy: “[I]nstead of posturing and pumped-up animosity a Labour Government under my leadership will set out a plan for Brexit based on the mutual interests of both Britain and the European Union”. He added that “EU member states have a mutual interest in maintaining and developing that trade with this country”, concluding: “There’s no such thing as ‘no deal’. If we leave without a positive agreement because we have needlessly alienated everyone we still have to trade with the EU, but we’ll have to have terms for that trade and very bad ones at that. Theresa May says no deal is better than a bad deal, let’s be clear, no deal is in fact a bad deal, it is the worst of all deals. … In sector after sector, no deal would prove to be an economic disaster. Theresa May’s approach risks a jobs meltdown across Britain. Instead, Labour will negotiate a tariff-free deal with the EU which will benefit both sides.”

Theresa May strikes a different note. Despite a number of conciliatory and constructive overtures in her January Lancaster House speech, she has repeatedly asserted that “no deal is better than a bad deal”. In her recent Brexit speech she promised “If you vote to … strengthen my hand, I’ll fight to get the best Brexit deal for Britain. I’ll stand up for Britain and fight for Britain to guarantee our economic security … “.

The obvious rhetorical difference is between an emphasis on “mutual interests” on the one hand, and focus on “fighting” and “standing up” for Britain on the other.

To the extent these styles represent different negotiating strategies, which one is likely to be more successful?

The art of negotiation has been researched in great depth and across many disciplines including business studies, psychology and political science. A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this article, but the popular business book Getting to Yes is a helpful starting point. It sets out a number of key principles for effective negotiation based on cooperation. One of these is to “focus on interests, not positions”, echoing Deutsch’s problem-solving approach to resolving conflict. Deutsch also argues that the effectiveness of this approach depends on whether the two parties’ goals in a negotiation or conflict are positively interdependent, i.e. whether one party attaining their goals makes it more likely the other will, too. [2]

One answer, therefore, to the question of a successful Brexit strategy might be that it depends on whether we think goals and interests are positively or negatively interdependent. Or put a different way, whether there is a finite pie – if one side gets more, the other gets less – or whether this is something different, where ultimately the pie will be increased if interests are aligned and decreased if they’re not.

Part of the difficulty is that Brexit contains elements of both.

First, the so-called divorce settlement, the amount the UK will need to pay to the EU27 to settle its outstanding commitments and liabilities, is arguably a typical haggle or “finite pie” situation. One side’s gain is the other side’s loss. Classic examples are haggling over goods in a market, or an insurance dispute. One way to approach this sort of situation without leaving either party feeling aggrieved or wronged is to agree on external or objective calculation criteria rather than argue about the sum in itself (something the European Commission has been advocating). This might require a more cooperative rhetoric in which fairness and reasonableness are emphasised, instead of winning or fighting.

Beyond the divorce settlement, we face a different type of situation. Here, there are strong arguments for examining closely the interests of both sides to identify how the negotiation might lead to an outcome that is in the best possible interests of both sides.

It is possible that Theresa May and her Brexit team will subscribe to these principles when it comes to the nitty-gritty of the negotiation. Some of the recent rhetoric about “fighting” for Britain’s interests may indeed be “posturing” rather than representing an actual negotiation strategy. But even if the Conservatives do aim for a cooperative approach to the negotiations, the bottom line – and difference to Labour – remains: “No deal is better than a bad deal”. The Tories have argued they would be in a weak bargaining position if they did not express their willingness to walk away from the negotiation. Yes, we are taught that negotiators should know their “BATNA” (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement): “If you do not know the best you are likely to obtain without negotiating, you might accept an offer you should reject or might reject an offer better than you can otherwise get.” [3]

But there are two problems with this. First, do the Tories – does anyone – know what the “best” is that we are likely to obtain without negotiating? Nowhere have they spelt out how we would replace EU trade worth £600bn annually if there was no agreement, or how we would compensate for the increases in costs and red tape that tariffs, complicated customs procedures and concerns about safety and quality standards of products from outside the EU would impose on the British economy. Other countries do not all support the same health and environmental standards as the UK and EU, and some have their own demands that undermine exactly the aims the Conservatives are purporting to address, such as increased visa access. Secondly, the idea that we should be willing to “walk away” takes us right back to haggling with the market trader. With the market trader, if we walk away, we need never engage with that person again or indeed visit their market. That is not the case with the EU, as the Guardian’s Rafael Behr argued recently. Instead the threat of walking away could lead to “a climate of acrimony, frozen trade, travel gridlock and financial meltdown”.

The EU27 are our allies and neighbours. Our economies and societies are irrevocably and inextricably linked through trade and history, through supply chains and science and research collaborations, through common environmental and resource concerns. The idea that we could walk away from a negotation about our shared future relationship is untenable.

The only possible constructive approach to the months ahead is an honest and open examination of both the UK’s, and the wider EU’s, interests, and the pursuit of agreements that will serve both sets of interests. Of course there will be trade-offs. But threatening to walk away is the easy option (until reality bites). Much harder to face up to diversity of interests that have been expressed throughout the referendum and election campaigns and find a balance that gives voice to legitimate concerns, and yet takes account of evidence and the practical realities of steering Britain safely through today’s globalised world.

Jeremy Corbyn’s recognition that no deal would be the worst deal at least grasps this truth.

Notes:

(1) Deutsch, Morton (1985). “Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective”. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. 255-56; 265.

(2) Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), cited in Spangler, Brad. “Competitive and Cooperative Approaches to Conflict.” Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003 [http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/competitive-cooperative-frames ]

(3) Jay Folberg, Dwight Golann, Thomas Stipanowich & Lisa Kloppenberg, Cooperative or Interest-Based Negotiation. From Resolving Disputes: Theory, Practice & Law, Chapter 4 (2d ed. 2010)